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Abstract 
The knowledge transfer efficiency (KTE) is closely relative to the success or failure of technology innovation in 
strategic alliances. This paper takes the KTE as the essential variable to establish the benefit function model of 
technology innovations to explore the KTE’s influences on partners’ innovative decisions under two different modes: 
independent innovations and alliance innovations. It is found that the higher the KTE, the greater the reducing extent 
of production costs is. The results could provide some theoretical supports for selections of the optimal competitive-
cooperative relationship and managerial flexibility in technical innovation alliances. 
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of [name organizer] 
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1   Introduction 
Along with the enhancement of intellectual capital in the process of value creation, knowledge is 
becoming the key element of firm development instead of traditional productive factors such as labor, 
capital and land. In order to keep competitive advantage, firms must transfer their knowledge, and 
technical innovation alliances have provided a good opportunity for knowledge transfer, knowledge 
acquisition and knowledge learning [[1]]. Knowledge transfer refers to the dissemination which 
knowledge transfers with different ways among organizations [[2]]. Technical innovation alliances are 
essentially the processes of knowledge transfer, knowledge creation and knowledge application [[3]]. 
Therefore, knowledge transfer processes have become the focus of attention [[4]]. The processes are 
mainly affected by learning intention of partners, transfer ability of knowledge sources and acceptance 
ability of knowledge recipients [[5]-[7]].  
Simultaneously, interaction quality and trust level among members, knowledge transfer modes, as well 
as relational risks have significant impacts on the processes in technical innovation alliances [[8]-[10]]. 
One of important goals for members jointing in a technical innovation alliance is to learn the necessary 
knowledge from partners through the intermediary of partners, and the success or failure of knowledge 
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learning is closely related to alliance cooperation [[11]]. How to carry out knowledge transfer and 
distribution of outputs rationally for partners according to its position in the course of knowledge transfer 
is crucial to the success of alliance innovations [[12]]. In view of these, by comparing the different 
knowledge transfer efficiencies (KTEs) between independent innovations and alliance innovations, this 
paper takes KTEs as essential variables to establish the benefit function model of technology innovations 
under these two different innovative modes, and analysis the KTE’s influences on partners’ decisions in a 
technical innovation alliance. 
2   Model of KTE for technical innovation alliances 
2.1   Basic Assumptions 
a) Marketing needs: Assume n enterprises with homogenous alternative products could spontaneously 
establish a technical innovation alliance to realize advantages complementary, risks and resources sharing 
for technology innovations, their marketing total demands are 
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Here iq  is the production of enterprise i . The corresponding demand price describes with a linear 
function. Namely, the inverse demand function of total demands is 
( )p Q a bQ                         (2) 
Where, 0a ! and 0b ! , /Q a b , p is product market price.  
b) Innovative inputs: Enterprises could continuously invest capital to technology innovations for 
reducing costs and increasing profits. To maintain competitive advantages, enterprises will select the 
rational input level to maximize their own profits. ix  is the reducing extent of unit cost for enterprise i
under rational input level, which is viewed as innovative profits. The profits are monotonically increasing 
relationships with innovative inputs. ( )if x  is the function of innovative inputs, and the first and second 
derivative of the function are both greater than zero, i.e., ' 0f ! , '' 0f ! , which indicate the unit input 
increases with the scale of R&D. Therefore, innovative inputs are the quadratic function of innovative 
profits.  
2( )i i i iI f x xJ                       (3) 
Here, 0iJ ! . It is the usage efficiency of innovative inputs. Equation (3) shows that the larger 
reducing extents of unit cost, the more innovative inputs are. 
c) KTEs: Because of knowledge spillovers, when production costs of enterprise i  are reduced with 
technology innovations, production costs of enterprise j  could be also declined. Similarly, when 
production costs of enterprise j are reduced with technology innovations, production costs of enterprise i
could be also declined. Thereby, It is necessary that the KTE is introduced, i.e., O  and 0 1Od d . When 
production costs of enterprise i  could be reduced ix  with technology innovations inputs ( )if x ,
production costs of enterprise j  could be also declined j ixO  because of knowledge spillovers. Set up 
sO  is the KTE with independent innovations, and aO  is the KTE with Alliance innovations. s aO Od
indicates that the KTE with independent innovations is less than it with alliance innovations. Since 
partners remain independence in technical innovation alliances, there are usually 1aO d .
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d) Production costs: Inherent unit production costs of enterprise i  are ic , and production costs of 
enterprise i  is written as 
1 2
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i n i i i j
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C x x x c x xO
z  
   ¦""                (4) 
Namely, production costs of enterprise i  can mainly be influenced by inherent unit production costs, 
innovative inputs of enterprises i  and j , as well as the KTE. 
2.2   Model Building 
Whether technology innovations are implemented independently or jointed with others, relational 
enterprises pursue fundamentally to maximize their own benefits, which drive them to reduce costs and 
increase profits continuously through upgrading technology and reforming management style. It is noted 
that technology innovations not only increases their own competitive advantage, but also make their 
innovative achievements diffusion which makes other enterprises profits with spillovers. Knowledge 
transfer has happened in fact, which doesn’t always come from the innovative enterprises own will. 
Clearly, compared to the active KTE in technical innovation alliances, the passive KTE isn’t high. 
Therefore, the KTE is viewed as the key variable to build the model to analyze its influencing mechanism 
on technical innovation alliances. According to basic assumptions, profit functions of enterprises ,i j  are 
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2.3   Model Solutions 
a) Independent innovations: When they implement independently technology innovations, enterprises 
with homogenous alternative products compete with each other in the market and don’t form collusion. 
Keeping relative competitive advantages, enterprises maximize their own profits under rational 
innovative inputs. To simplify the calculation, there are only two enterprises in the market, 
namely 2,n  i jQ q q  . These two enterprises’ inherent unit production costs and useful efficiencies of 
innovative inputs are equal to respectively, namely 1 2c c c  , i jJ J J  . In this model, we only consider 
KTEs are symmetrical, namely i jO O O  . Thereby, equation (5) can be rewritten as 
2
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By solving the first order condition of equation(6), optimal productions of enterprises are obtained as 
*
*
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Equation (7) substitutes equation (5)ˈand optimal benefits of enterprises are gained as 
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Since enterprises implement independently technology innovations, they decide innovative inputs 
separately. By solving the first order condition of equation(8), optimal reducing extents of costs for 
enterprises form independent innovations are gotten as 
* * * ( )(2 )
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Equation (9) indicates that *isx  and 
*
jsx  will increase with reduction of sO , which expresses that the 
lower the KTE, the more reducing extents of costs are. This is because the KTE in independent 
innovations is not originally high. Enterprises can only rely on their own innovative inputs to reduce costs. 
It is impossible to obtain high profits from spillovers of competitive enterprises. So, it is very important 
that innovation Achievements could be kept strictly secret. Enterprises reduce the passive KTE as much 
as possible which neither enterprises gain resources from competitors’ innovation, nor competitors obtain 
from their own innovation, which is confirmed by equation(8). In the other words, competitor costs 
decrease representing enterprise own profits reduce.  
b) Alliance innovations: When they commonly build a technical innovation alliance to realize 
technology innovations, enterprises with homogenous alternative products could no longer pursue to 
maximize their own profits to invest innovative resources. Although they are still independent, they 
maximize alliance’s profits as possible through reducing alliance’s costs with technology innovation 
under the rational distribution of profits. Thereby, the problem facing enterprises is how to reduce costs to 
maximize the whole income with the KTE.  
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By solving the first order condition of equation(10), optimal reducing extents of costs for enterprises 
are gained as. 
* * *
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Equation (11) indicates that  *iax  and 
*
jax  increase with increasing sO , which express that the higher 
the active KTE, the more reducing extents of costs are. This is because enterprises participating in the 
technical innovation alliance select the level of innovative inputs from maximizing the whole profits. 
Further, the active KTE is higher than the passive KTE of independent innovation. 
3   Relationship between innovative incremental profit and KTE 
In the above model foundation and solution, we make a difference between two KTEs with independent 
innovations and alliance innovations, and suppose that the passive KTE with independent innovations is 
lower than the active KTE with alliance innovations, which is based on the premise of s aO O . Now, we 
relax the assumption s aO O , and assume that enterprises have the same KTE O with independent 
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innovations and alliance innovations in order to explicitly compare increased profits and reduced costs 
under these two different innovative modes. 
3.1   Incremental Profits with Independent Innovations 
Assume that enterprises have same innovative inputs 2( ) ( )is js sf x f x xJ  with independent innovations. 
Before innovating, they have 0is js sx x x   . Thereby, according to equation (8), optimal profits of 
enterprises are calculated as 
* * * 2
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S S S                          (12) 
After innovating, optimal profits of enterprises are calculated as follows. 
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Equation (13) subtracts equation(12), and incremental profits with independent innovations are 
gained as. 
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Equation (9) substitutes equation(14), and incremental profits with independent innovations are 
rewritten as 
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3.2   Incremental Profits with Alliance Innovations 
Simultaneously, assume that enterprises have same innovative inputs 2( ) ( )ia ja af x f x xJ  with alliance 
innovations. Under these innovative inputs, enterprises can obtain optimal profits for 
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Equation (16) subtracts equation(12), and incremental profits with alliance innovations are gained as 
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Equation (9) substitutes equation(17), and incremental profits with alliance innovations are rewritten 
as
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3.3   Incremental Profits Comparative Analysis 
To compare incremental profits from independent innovations and alliance innovations, we let equation 
(15) equal to equation (18).  
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By solving equation(19), the result can be gained as follows. 
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To describe vividly the influencing mechanism of KTE, we setup 
50, 0.8, 18, [0.35,0.55,0.75]a b c J    . And then, these data substitute equations (15), (18), (19) and 
(20). Combined with the value range of KTE is 0 1Od d , the curves of relationship between the 
incremental profit S'  and the KTE O  can be drawn as Fig. 1(a, b, c). 
( 0.35)a J  ǂ                 ( 0.55)b J                    ( 0.75)c J  
Fig. 1. Relationship between incremental profit and KTE
The solid curve in Fig. 1(a, b, c) expresses the relationships between the incremental profit and the KTE 
under the case of forming a technical innovation alliance for technology innovations. The dashed curve in 
Fig. 1(a, b, c) indicates the relationships between the incremental profit and the KTE under the case of 
independent technology innovation. The intersection points of these two curves are roots 1 2[ , ]O O  of 
equation(19). The following conclusions can be gained from Fig. 1(a, b, c). 
Fig. 1(a, b, c) shows that incremental profits of enterprises from technology innovations crease with 
increasing the KTE, when they carry on technology innovation through forming a technical innovation 
alliance. Moreover, Fig. 1a shows that incremental profits of enterprises from technology innovations 
don’t entirely increase with increasing the KTE, when they carry on technology innovations with 
independent innovations. 
a. When the KTE is 2O Ot , the increasing speed of incremental profits with independent 
innovations from technology innovations with their own power becomes gradually descending. Further, 
the increasing speed of incremental profits with alliance innovations becomes gradually ascending, which 
illustrates that optimal decisions of enterprises are to participate in some technical innovation alliances to 
implement technology innovations.  
b. When the KTE is 1 2O O Od  , the increasing speed of incremental profits with independent 
innovations is faster relatively than the increasing speed of incremental profits from technology 
innovation forming the technical innovation alliance, which illustrates that the optimal decision of 
enterprises is to carry on technology innovation with their own power. 
c. When the KTE is 1O O , the increasing speed of incremental profits with alliance innovations is 
faster relatively than the increasing speed of incremental profits with independent innovations, which 
illustrates that the optimal decision of enterprises is to forming the technical innovation alliance for 
technology innovation.  
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d. When the KTE is 1 2[ , ]O O O , the incremental profits with alliance innovations are greater than 
the incremental profits with independent innovations. When the KTE is 1 2[ , ]O O O , the incremental profits 
with alliance innovations are lower than the incremental profits with independent innovations. 
4   Conclusions 
The KTE is used to capture the impact on decisions of technology innovation for enterprises. The KTE 
plays an important role in influencing partners’ decisions regarding the mode of technology innovation in 
technical innovation alliances. The KTE’s influencing model in technical innovation alliances is built 
under the cost-benefit framework. On this basis, different incremental profits are discussed separately 
from the two cases of technology innovation: independent innovations and alliance innovations. It is 
found that the higher the active KTE of enterprises in the technical innovation alliance, the greater 
reducing extents of costs from technology innovations are. The main reason is as enterprises decide the 
level of innovative inputs to maximize the whole benefits after participating in technical innovation 
alliances. Thus, the innovative spillovers increase which makes incremental profits with alliance 
innovations are greater than incremental profits with independent innovations. But, we do not consider 
influences of information asymmetry, lifecycles, nonlinear demands, as well as uncertainty on partners’ 
decisions of technology innovations in this model. Therefore, it is necessary to make more thorough 
discussions regarding these contents in the future. 
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